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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that representative bureaucracy is a changing concept, and that in the 
academic and policy debate on representative bureaucracy in fact three different debates are 
intermingled. While the debate on representative bureaucracy in Public Administration is 
generally situated within wider debates about tensions between bureaucracy and democracy, 
this is only part of the story. We argue that discussions and scholarship on representative 
bureaucracy in fact employ three different concepts of representative bureaucracy. The 
reasons for making the bureaucracy representative in these three rival concepts are quite 
divergent, and even the conception of what representativity means is totally different. These 
rival concepts reflect a particular view on the role of the state and the relation between states 
and citizens. 
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Introduction 
Representative bureaucracy is often denoted by a series of virtues; virtues that facilitate the 
building of a state and a nation. Representativity would bring legitimacy, implementation 
capacity, effectiveness, et cetera. Despite representative bureaucracy being one of the first 
fields in public administration to achieve integration and solid empirical grounding, many 
studies continue to focus on single (national) cases, and the Anglo-Saxon dominance is often 
quite strong. These approaches, models and concepts do not always translate easily to other 
national settings, especially when these settings are quite different from a Western or even 
US-American environment. Lim for instance showed the dangers of transferring the concept 
of active representation to developing countries, by highlighting its potential for clientelism 
and abuse of power (Lim 2006). 
 
Our key argument in this paper is that representative bureaucracy is a changing concept, and 
that in the academic and policy debate on representative bureaucracy in fact three different 
debates are intermingled. While the debate on representative bureaucracy in Public 
Administration is generally situated within wider debates about tensions between bureaucracy 
and democracy, this is only part of the story. We argue that discussions and scholarship on 
representative bureaucracy in fact employ three different concepts of representative 
bureaucracy. The reasons for making the bureaucracy representative in these three rival 
concepts are quite divergent, and even the conception of what representativity means is totally 
different. These rival concepts reflect a particular view on the role of the state and the relation 
between states and citizens. 
 
In this paper we analyse, using historical examples and recent developments in the literature, 
the three different approaches to ‘representative bureaucracy’ and the specific characteristics 
of these approaches to develop a contingent approach to representativity. The first is the 
political literature which highlights a certain conception of representativity of the civil service 
towards the ruling class, because it helps states to establish control and guarantee harmony 
and stability (Kingsley 1944; Tilly 1975). The second is the public administration literature, 
with its strong emphasis on reconciling bureaucracy with democracy and on equal 
opportunities, and its distinction between active and passive representation (Mosher 1968; 
Coleman Selden, Brudney et al. 1998; Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003). The growing body of 
diversity management literature that is applied to the administrative context is the third and 
most recent strand in literature. It focuses on the benefits of diversity for the performance of 
public sector organisations (Pitts, 2005; Wise & Tschirhart, 2000). 
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Governments’ talk and action about representative bureaucracy can be situated within these 
three rival views. The approach we take in this paper is a contingency approach. By this we 
mean that changes in the use of the concept of ‘representative bureaucracy’ can be understood 
by looking at the environment within which the public administration operates. Note that this 
is a different use of ‘contingency’ as the one used in diversity and representative bureaucracy 
research looking at the effect of factors such as discretion, autonomy, or job structuration on 
active representation (see e.g. Meier and Bohte 2001). Through using a contingency approach 
we show how representative bureaucracy has been used as a political and administrative 
answer to quite different social, political and administrative problems and challenges. Not all 
types of representative bureaucracy suit all social, political and administrative settings. 
Through analysing these environments, we hope this paper contributes to nation builders’ 
quest for a fitting type of representative bureaucracy in the contexts they are working in. 
National conditions make certain approaches more appropriate than others. In emerging 
nations, failed states, or states coping with political tensions, a power approach may be 
preferable. A diversity approach is then more appropriate in a national context where public 
services operate in a business-like way, and where the delivery of services is relatively a-
political. Such a concept of contingent representativity should help nation builders to avoid 
implementing unsuitable representativeness policies. 
 
In this paper, we first outline three approaches to representative bureaucracy and explain their 
emergence through elaborate referencing to social and political conditions, and to changing 
approaches in academic research. We then distil key characteristics and differences between 
these approaches. We end the paper by discussing some lessons learned for nation building 
and by discussing emerging trends. 
  
Representative bureaucracy as power  
Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy and political harmony 
The phrase ‘representative bureaucracy’ is generally believed to have been coined by Donald 
Kingsley. His classic 1944 book ‘Representative bureaucracy: An interpretation of the British 
civil service’ (Kingsley 1944) is remembered more for its title though than for its exact 
content. Rather than outlining topics we now generally associate with representative 
bureaucracy, Kingsley’s main argument is one for political harmony (Subramaniam 1967: 
1013). In his view, an administration that does not represent the dominant forces in society is 
bound to be ineffective. It follows that the bureaucracy has to be representative of the ruling 
class, and not so much of society at large.  
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This does not mean that the bureaucracy is a conservative, stable and unchanging body. 
Instead, it has to adapt itself constantly to changing circumstances. Social and political change 
requires changes in the recruitment into the administration. Without such adaptation, the 
administration is bound to become irrelevant in the political power-play because it will be 
overtaken by rival arrangements. By making the civil service representative of the new and 
emerging ruling classes, it could contribute to a harmonious society, and enjoy legitimacy 
among those who count. In Kingsley’s view this required an end of the dominance of the old 
families and aristocracy and a shift of power to a newly emerged ruling class and to an ever 
strengthening middle class. This shift was required because the public administration had 
ceased to be representative of a political system that had changed. The rise of the middle class 
and the decline of the aristocracy took considerable time to be reflected in the composition of 
the top layers in public administration, and this slowly began to jeopardise its legitimacy.  
 
The public administration is thus not so much only seen as a body for the efficient provision 
of public services, but also as an instrument to create political stability and harmony. Only 
when the administration is representative of the dominant classes can it be effective. 
Otherwise it will be ignored, and the power of the ruler weakened. Making an administration 
representative is thus a political strategy to establish, protect or share power.  
 
Representative bureaucracy and establishing control 
Kingsley’s view is just one expression of behaviour and actions we can observe throughout 
the early days of modern public administration. It reflects a wider trend that had been going 
on in Europe for several decades and even centuries. It reflects the gradual evolution from a 
patriarchal power system to a merit-based one. 
 
This ‘representativeness as power’ approach reflects an unstable and changing political 
system within which a central power attempts to establish its power. Having a loyal 
administration becomes a key concern. Such an administration can support the power 
structure and assist the established power against challengers. Creating stability and control 
are key issues. Creating such stability requires the neutralisation of internal challenges to 
power, and the creation of popular and regional attachment to the new state (Tilly 1992; Van 
de Walle and Scott 2009). We find these two processes in the reform of public administration 
and the recruitment into the administration. 
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Establishing power and neutralising challengers 
Creating stability and control through neutralising dissent and resistance using the state’s 
administrative system can be done in two different ways. One is to incorporate existing 
alternative power structures into the administration. The other is to disenfranchise powerful 
groups by closing off their access to the administration. 
 
A first way to secure power is to align the interests of the central power and those of 
alternative power structures (Migdal 2001). By making the central administration 
representative of the interests of rivals its legitimacy and stability is increased. This can be 
done by reserving key positions in this administration for supporters, followers, and family 
members of these rival powers. In this way, public employment is used as an instrument to 
reward loyalty; as an instrument to create material dependence on the new state; but also as a 
way to keep challengers in close view. In the ‘representativity as power’ approach, 
representativeness does not extend to the general population, but only to powerful segments in 
this population. Non-powerful segments of the population are not regarded as potential 
challengers, and therefore do not have to be neutralised. It is important to note though that 
changing political circumstances make this a strategy that requires constant attention. In more 
recent approaches to representative bureaucracy we still see this strategy at work when the 
political-administrative system responds to underrepresented groups that become more vocal 
and organised. 
 
Another strategy used to counter resistance has been to exclude and neutralise challengers. 
The increasing popularity of merit-based public recruitment came in very handy to this end. 
Merit-based recruitment changed the criteria for entrance to powerful positions. This in some 
way allowed for the exclusion of traditionally represented groups, such as the aristocracy 
(Jacoby 1973). The gradual replacement of the aristocracy by middle class bureaucrats should 
thus not only be seen as evidence of an evolution towards a merit-based administration, but 
also as evidence of a deliberate attempt to open up the administration to new groups in 
society. This is also reflected in Kingsley’s analysis of changes in the British civil service and 
the first breaches in the old aristocracy-dominated system. These changes did not start as a 
result of middle class pressures or popular demand, but much earlier following conflicts 
between King and aristocracy (Kingsley 1944: 43), and an attempt by the King to reduce the 
power of this group. Weber himself gave the example of recruitment of officials form the 
propertyless strata as a means for rulers to increase their power, because they, contrary to the 
propertied strata, cannot permit themselves to loose their offices (Gerth and Wright Mills 
1974: 235). 
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This opening up of traditional bureaucratic systems had two important consequences. One 
was the strengthening of the state vis-à-vis competing centres of power (traditional 
aristocracy); the other was the incorporation of rising groups in society (middle class) into the 
administration, partly as an attempt to professionalise the administration, partly as an attempt 
to secure their support for the state.  
Rather than being a positive argument for making the administration more efficient, or for 
making it more democratic through including more members from the bourgeoisie, 
meritocracy came as a useful tool to break the dominance of traditional aristocracy in the 
administration. This ‘Weberian’ meritocratic turn in Western public administrations from the 
19th century on however also changed the debate on representative bureaucracy, because it 
gradually replaced power by efficiency and neutral competence as the principal raison d’être 
of a bureaucracy.  
 
Representative bureaucracy and the creation of a sense of belonging 
A second main challenge in the process of building new states was to create a degree of 
mental adherence to the state and to demonstrate national unity. Emerging states were still 
fragmented, with many peripheral regions, and consisted of regions that used to have their 
own political identity (Tilly 1975; Tilly 1992). Territorial dividing lines tended to coincide 
with political dividing lines. Popular identification thus had to be shifted from these units to 
the new central state. One way to change and strengthen this identification was to fully 
include elites and population of these regions into the new administrative system, thereby 
avoiding creating any impressions of submission or second rate citizenship. 
Early expressions of representative bureaucracy reflect a need to establish central power, and 
to counter regionalist tendencies. Creating central power and creating harmony within the 
(often new) national territories were crucial considerations. The key issue in the 
‘representativity as power’ discussion is the concern to create political stability, harmony and 
control. Public administration is one of the instruments to create such stability. Public 
administrations that do not in some way reflect existing power structures are bound to be 
ineffective. Public bureaucracies are not just service organisations, but powerful control 
instruments (Hummel 1977; Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981). 
The fragility of the new political structures required a careful approach to filling 
administrative positions. Characteristic of this approach is that the bureaucracy was not seen 
as something detached from the political system. Political considerations guided the 
composition of the administration, because disregarding the political dimension would have 
severe consequences for the effectiveness of the administration. 
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Many of the early references to representative bureaucracy for this reason referred to a 
territorial dimension: A bureaucracy entirely composed of inhabitants of a single region of the 
country (e.g. that around the capital city) was seen as undesirable. Two early documents 
establishing modern administrations clearly reflect this desire to be territorially representative. 
The Pendleton Act in the US for instance provided for a representation of all States and 
territories in the central bureaucracy:  
 
‘Third, appointments to the public service aforesaid in the departments at Washington 
shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia 
upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census. Every application 
for an examination shall contain, among other things, a statement, under oath, setting forth 
his or her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application, as well as how 
long he or she has been a resident of such place’ (Pendleton Act, Sec. 2, USA, 1883) 
 
Likewise, the Northcote-Trevelyan report on the organisation of the permanent civil service in 
the UK expressed concerns about the risk of having a bureaucracy whose entrance mechanism 
privileged inhabitants of certain areas over those of other areas. It felt such could have effects 
on the bureaucracy’s legitimacy:  
 
‘In dealing with the lower class of appointments, it will be necessary to make provision 
against the difficulty that if the examinations were all held at one place, a large proportion 
of those who might reasonably become candidates would be deterred from presenting 
themselves by the expense of the journey. If the scheme of examinations were more 
favourable to one locality than another, there can be no doubt that it would soon be set 
aside as unjust. We propose, therefore, that an arrangement should be made for holding 
examinations in various parts of the United Kingdom.’ (Northcote-Trevelyan report, 1853, 
p. 15) 
 
Representativeness as power in the wider academic literature 
While not popular or prominent nowadays in current literature on representative bureaucracy, 
we do see aspects of the ‘representativity as power’ approach in current thinking about 
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representative bureaucracy and related debates, and in the current organisation of public 
sectors (Meier and O'Toole 2006). 
Spoils vs. representative bureaucracy 
While not generally seen as part of the literature on representative bureaucracy, much of the 
literature on political-administrative relations actually also deals with issues of representative 
bureaucracy. When the political party in power changes it needs a sympathetic administration 
to work with – the administration has to be representative towards the political system and the 
party in power. This is crucial to make government effective. In his book, Kingsley argues for 
representative bureaucracy to make government effective. A new ruling party is likely to be 
overwhelmed by the administration if this administration is not representative and filled with 
officials with opposing political views. Bureaucratic representativeness is necessary because 
the ruling party needs to be able to work with sympathetic administrators. Especially after 
major political changes, this can be difficult. For this reason, Kingsley (1944) argued for a 
representative bureaucracy with many colours and creeds, because this guaranteed long-term 
stability and government effectiveness. 
It is important to mention that these debates about representative bureaucracy are not framed 
as a discussion about spoils. Instead, the change in political power is first and foremost seen 
as a reflection of a change in society. The logic behind this argument is that the electoral 
process signals a change in society, and that a public administration that reflects the previous 
governing arrangement therefore no longer reflects the power and opinions in society. By 
including a variety of political opinions in the corps of administrators the risk of a major 
disconnection between the values and opinions of public officials and those of the population 
and their elected politicians is minimised.  
Lustration processes can be seen in a similar way (Ellis 1996; David 2006). They reflect a 
desire to make the administration representative of changed norms in society, in this case after 
a major political change or upheaval with the intention of making the administration effective, 
or to bring it in line with the new accepted norms of the society within which it operates. 
 
Administrative power-sharing and representative bureaucracy 
We also see similarities between the ‘representativeness as power’ approach and the political 
science literature on power-sharing and accommodation. This set of literature, using concepts 
such as power-sharing, accommodation, or consociationalism, looks at public administration 
as an instrument to create stability in divided societies (Mcrae 1974; Lijphart 1977; Rokkan, 
Urwin et al. 1987; Esman 1999). Through using quota, proportionality, and reserved key 
positions, attempts are made to make public administration more representative of political 
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and cultural minorities and to counter dominance of the administration by a single group. The 
purpose of such arrangements is not so much to make the administration proportional to the 
population or the political constellation, but to come to a negotiated representation of groups 
in the administration and to create stability through doing this. These administrative 
arrangements are representative of society because they are ‘collections of standard operating 
procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities, and 
beliefs.’ (March and Olsen 1989: 17). 
 
Implications 
As this review shows, the representativity as power approach is quite different from what is 
now generally seen as ‘representative bureaucracy’. Kingsley’s view that a representative 
bureaucracy is one that is representative to dominant forces in society clearly conflicts with 
what we would now consider to be representative. The result is that, paraphrasing Meier and 
Nigro, Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy (reflecting the dominant social class) would 
now generally be seen as highly unrepresentative (Meier and Nigro 1976: 459). A second 
implication of this view is that making a bureaucracy representative is not always a gradual 
process. Fast-moving changes in the political power structure may have immediate 
implications for the composition of the public administration. Whereas gradual change is at 
the core of newer models of representative bureaucracy, the ‘representativeness as power’ 
approach also allows us to explain abrupt short term changes in the composition of public 
administrations, especially at the top level. 
 
Representative bureaucracy as equal opportunity 
Kingsley’s book also contains many arguments now generally associated with ‘traditional’ 
approaches to representative bureaucracy. Apart from his argument that an effective 
administration has to be representative of dominant classes in society, he also called for a 
stronger representation of the middle and working classes in the administration (Subramaniam 
1967), because these groups had grown to become more powerful in society. It also followed 
a widespread observation that the administration did not function efficiently because it was 
captured by certain groups, esp. the traditional upper classes.  
A second stream of thinking about representative bureaucracy followed discontent in 
European public administration about the continuing domination of upper-level administrative 
positions by a small ruling class, often educated in a small number of elite schools, and in 
American public administration about the serious underrepresentation or virtual absence of 
minority ethnic groups in (parts of) the bureaucracy (Subramaniam 1967). In the 1970s, 
debates on representative bureaucracy suddenly became heated and omnipresent (Krislov 
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1974). Different from but building on Kingsley’s notion, representative bureaucracy now 
became a central concern for policymakers and public administration scholars: bureaucracies 
need to be representative of the population for them to have legitimacy and public credibility 
(Krislov 1974).  
This second conception of representative bureaucracy extends the definition of 
representativity. Bureaucracies now had to be ‘representative of the population’, rather than 
just of a (dominant) section of this population. They had to provide equal opportunities. The 
implication of this shift in thinking is that the bureaucracy is no longer considered as a body 
that is situated below the legislative power, but as a parallel body – and even as a democratic 
and political body in its own right. Hence the representativeness requirements applying to 
parliaments were now extended to the public administration (see also the extract from the 
Pendleton act in the previous section for a similar reasoning). Just as parliaments represented 
the population, bureaucracies now have to represent the population. Bureaucracies are first 
and foremost accountable to the citizens and only in second place to the legislature. 
 
The discovery of administrative discretion 
This shift in thinking follows two wider developments, one in the public administration 
discipline, the other in politics and society. In public administration theory the decades after 
WWII period saw two major changes. One was a growing recognition that politics and 
administration couldn’t really be separated, and that perhaps they shouldn’t. Appleby saw in 
political interference a check on arbitrary bureaucratic power (Appleby 1945), and Waldo 
ended strict dichotomy thinking though his famous assertion that ‘all administration is 
politics’ (Waldo 1948). The other change was a logical consequence of the increasing 
importance of the behaviouralist method in public administration which made scholars look 
inside bureaucracies. Inside these bureaucracies they found that bureaucrats were not neutral 
and distant Weberians, but that they made policy. Policy bureaucrats were found to have 
political opinions and ambitions (Meier and Nigro 1976), and street-level bureaucrats made 
policy through more or less consequent decisions and choices at the interface between public 
administration and citizens (Katz and Eisenstadt 1960; Blau 1963; Katz and Danet 1973; 
Lipsky 1980). 
 
From these two observations followed the quite logical conclusion that it did matter a lot who 
was filling administrative positions (Meier and Bohte 2001). Continuing to pretend that 
bureaucrats were neutral and merely implementing policy has become an untenable position. 
This shift in thinking about bureaucracies paralleled changes in political science at that time. 
Research into political systems in fragmented societies revealed a wealth of political power-
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sharing and consociationalist arrangements (Krislov 1974; Mcrae 1974; Lijphart 1977), 
moving the discipline away from its narrow conception of political representation as 
something that was the direct and inevitable result of elections only. 
 
Social turbulence and New Public Administration 
Around the same time in the late 1960s and the 1970s social and political changes (in the US) 
challenged traditional patterns of public administration. Rising social contestation following 
the Vietnam War disaster, inner city riots following defective race relations, and the spectre of 
social fragmentation and poverty transformed the outlook on the role of the bureaucracy and 
the individual civil servant. Citizens wanted more influence, and the 1970s saw an increase in 
bottom-up participation, neighbourhood councils etc. 
 
The emergence of the New Public Administration movement meant a strong and vocal (but 
also relatively short) break with the past (Marini 1971; Waldo 1971; Frederickson 1980). 
Civil servants had to become policy entrepreneurs and actively work for the poor and the 
disadvantaged in society through exercising their discretion. Inside public organisations 
organisational participation and behaviour became the new catchphrases, thereby sowing the 
seeds of the later diversity movement (cf. infra).  
 
Equal opportunities and affirmative action (EO/AA) 
One of the main ways proposed by the NPA movement to make the administration more 
responsive to popular wishes and concerns was to make it more representative. Exemplary of 
this shift is Samuel Krislov’s 1967 book ‘The Negro in Federal employment: The quest for 
equal opportunity’, which helped set the agenda for the civil rights movement. The book not 
only compiled facts about the underrepresentation of an entire group in the administration but 
also made a wider social justice argument for equal opportunities. This required abandoning 
the idea of the faceless and anonymous bureaucrat and the idea of a strict separation between 
policy and implementation. Traditional models putting the legislative power at the top of a 
democratic hierarchy, delegating implementation to the administration were discarded for 
their insufficiently democratic content. In his ‘Democracy and the public service’ Frederick 
Mosher considered the public service to be ‘thrice removed from democracy’ (Mosher 1968), 
because of the distance between citizen and bureaucrat and the absence of participatory 
democracy in public administration. Because bureaucracies are filled with appointed officials, 
all highly specialised, elected politicians have very little impact on these officials. With such a 
distance between the citizens, who elect politicians, and career officials, assuring that these 
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officers act in the interest of the people becomes an important challenge. A similar concern is 
expressed in a book not generally considered as part of the representative bureaucracy canon, 
despite its title. William Niskanen’s ‘Bureaucracy and representative government’ (Niskanen 
1971) develops an argument for controlling self-interested bureaucrats. While not proposing 
the same solutions as the more traditional representative bureaucracy scholars, Niskanen’s 
argument is based on similar concerns about the power of bureaucracies, and the need to 
control them. 
 
The renewed attention for representative bureaucracy did not only come from a concern to see 
the interests of (disadvantaged) groups better represented, and to make the public sector more 
responsive. It also reflects a concern about equal opportunities in the administration. Access 
to public sector jobs was seen as a basic democratic right, and as a tool for social promotion. 
To promote equal opportunities, efforts had to be made to increase the proportion of 
underrepresented groups in the administration. Equal opportunities policies and affirmative 
action (EO/AA) became tools to address this democratic deficit. Attention in the 
‘representativity as equal opportunity’ approach shifted to ethnicity and gender as key criteria 
to determine whether or not a bureaucracy was representative, downplaying the political and 
territorial characteristics that were at the core of the ‘representativity as power’ approach.  
 
Passive and active representation 
In this new way of thinking about representative bureaucracy, Mosher’s concept of active 
representation became very popular (Mosher 1968). Active representation goes beyond a 
mere passive or sociological representation. It calls upon officials from disadvantaged groups 
to actively use their position to promote the interests of the group they emanate from. Soon, 
however, it also became apparent that such active representation was only possible in jobs 
that allowed for the exercise of discretion (Meier and Bohte 2001), and that not all minority 
officials used the opportunity to actively represent the segment of the population they came 
from. Furthermore, researchers started to look at the potential trade-off between loyalty to 
one’s organisation and colleagues and active representation (Romzek and Hendricks 1982; 
Wilkins and Williams 2009). 
 
The emergence of the doctrine of representative bureaucracy as an essentially democratic 
concern thus follows new insights into how bureaucracies really work, social contestation, 
and growing worries about the power of bureaucracies. The emergence of New Public 
Administration was the ultimate reaction against the dysfunctions and excesses of the 
Weberian model, especially the illusion of a separation of implementation from policy and the 
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risk off ‘Beamtenherrschaft’. It resulted in the overthrow of most of the key Weberian 
characteristics in order to safeguard the public interest in a totally different way.  
 
Representative bureaucracy as Diversity management 
The equal opportunities approach to representative bureaucracy described above emphasizes 
that for democratic reasons government bureaucracies should represent groups in the same 
proportion as their share in the population. In other words, government bureaucracies should 
reflect the diversity of the general population, albeit the term diversity was seldom used by 
representative bureaucracy scholars. In the 90s however diversity becomes a key concept in 
discussions about representative bureaucracy. The focus now shifts from providing equal 
opportunities and representing disadvantaged groups to managing diversity in organisations.  
 
The diversity management approach to representative bureaucracy continues in the tradition 
of earlier approaches, but adds a strong focus on performance. Diversity management 
initiatives and academic diversity management research and literature emphasize a business 
case for diversity through focusing on the benefits of diversity for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public sector organisations (Meier, Wrinkle et al. 1999; Wise and Tschirhart 
2000; Pitts 2005). The earlier political, moral and democratic considerations for making 
bureaucracies representative made way for an economic logic for diversity. Originating in the 
US in a private sector context, this managing diversity approach was gradually adopted by 
Anglo-Saxon and Western European scholars focusing on public sector organisations. 
 
As was the case with the previous two approaches to representative bureaucracy, this one also 
had its roots in changes in society, such as the emergence of the New Public Management, 
and an increasing diversification of countries’ workforces. Because of the changing 
composition of the public sector workforce, effectively managing diverse workplaces became 
a key concern (Coleman Selden and Selden 2001).  
 
The rise of New Public Management 
The shift in focus towards managing diversity can be understood against the background of 
developments in the administrative and socio-demographic context of Western countries in 
recent decades. New Public Management-style reforms in the US, Anglo-saxon countries and 
Europe aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public sector organisations. 
NPM relied heavily on the importation of private sector management techniques into the 
public sector. Through making public organisations more business-like, it was thought, their 
performance would be improved. 
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One effect of NPM–style reforms was the abandonment of traditional bureaucratic models of 
personnel management, and their replacement by Human Resource Management (HRM). 
HRM models and instruments, mostly developed in the mid-80s in a private sector context, 
were introduced in public sector organisations (Boyne, Poole et al. 1999). HRM differs from 
the more traditional models of personnel management by conceiving employees as resources 
that should be developed in correspondence to the organisation’s (economic) goals  (Legge 
2005). 
In the HRM literature human resources are generally only differentiated by their educational 
levels and competencies, as these are seen to contribute directly to job and organisational 
performance. Diversity with respect to for example gender and ethnic-cultural background is 
not central to the HRM literature, or most of the time even completely absent. HRM is said to 
be focused on the development of the individual worker, but this ideal worker has no body, 
gender, race or age. 
 
Increasing diversity of the workforce 
The increasing diversity of the population due to immigration and increasing female labour 
market participation substantially changed the composition of the workforce in Western 
countries in the last decades. In a context where a diverse workforce is simply a fact, effective 
management of diversity becomes more and more a (managerial) issue. It is questioned 
whether managers would be able to realize the full potential of their diverse workforce when 
their management techniques are based on general HRM models. 
In response to the growing diversity of the US workforce Roosevelt Thomas coined the term 
‘Managing diversity’ in 1990. In his often cited article in Harvard Business Review Roosevelt 
Thomas (1990) argues to move beyond Affirmative Action policies, because these are unable 
to develop the full potential of a diverse workforce. As he (1990: 109) puts it: 
 
“Affirmative action gets the new fuel into the tank, the new people through the front 
door. Something else has to get them to the driver’s seat. That something else consists 
of enabling people, in this case minorities and women, to perform to their potential. 
This is what we now call managing diversity. […] Just managing diversity in such a 
way as to get from a heterogeneous work force the same productivity, commitment, 
quality, and profit that we got from the old homogeneous work force.” 
 
Like Human Resource Management approaches, diversity management focuses on the 
development of the individual, but moves beyond the abstract ideal worker on which HRM 
theories are often based. At the same time, however, diversity is not defined in terms of socio-
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demographic characteristics such as gender and race as is the case in the equal opportunity 
approaches, but includes all kinds of ways that individuals can differ from one another 
(Roosevelt Thomas 1990; Kellough and Naff 2004). In practice however, most managing 
diversity initiatives in organisations explicitly define the organisational workforce along 
gender and/or ethnic-cultural lines as do many scholars in the field. 
 
In short, the adoption of management models from the private sector aimed at improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public sector organisations coincided with the increasing 
diversity of the public sector workforce. As a follow-up of the more general HRM models 
diversity management was introduced in public sector organisations. 
 
Differences between EO/AA approaches and Diversity management 
The diversity management approach differs from the equal opportunity and affirmative action 
(EO/AA) approaches described in the previous section that were introduced in the 60s and 70s 
in several respects. EO/AA assumes that women and minorities are assimilated to the 
dominant organisational (mono)culture. Diversity management, on the other hand, implies 
that the organisation itself (‘the engine’) must be changed. Within managing diversity 
approaches diversity is valued in itself. If managed adequately, it improves work group and 
organisational performance (Thomas and Ely 1996; Wilson and Iles 1999). This also implies 
that adjusting recruitment and selection procedures is not enough. All Human Resource 
policies should be evaluated against their usefulness for managing a diverse workforce. 
 
In addition, within EO/AA diversity is pursued for reasons of equity and fairness, whereas 
diversity management is motivated by the contribution of diversity to the organisation’s 
efficiency and effectiveness. In other words, EO/AA approaches are based on moral and legal 
arguments formulated more or less independent of the organisation’s economic goals. In this 
respect, however, public and private sector organisations may differ. In fact, the moral 
arguments underlying EO/AA approaches refer to the legitimacy of a public sector 
organisation and in turn also to its efficacy, yet not in economic terms. Success of these kinds 
of programmes is determined accordingly: it is measured by the number of women and ethnic 
minorities within the organisation. As such, it is focused on descriptive (or sociological or 
symbolic) representation improving public sector’s legitimacy. 
Following the managing diversity line of reasoning however, these policies are internally and 
economically driven instead of imposed externally by legislation or moral claims. In other 
words, managing diversity rests on a business case argument, the hypothesis that a diverse 
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work force contributes to the organisation’s economic goals (Roosevelt Thomas 1990; 
Henderson 1994; Thomas and Ely 1996; Wilson and Iles 1999). 
 
Managing diversity and the business case argument 
The business case argument is fundamental to managing diversity theory and practice. This 
assertion refers to the strategic function of diversity management as well as its contribution to 
the efficacy of the internal organisation. 
 
The strategic function of managing diversity 
Through the employment of a diverse workforce new business opportunities are created. A 
diverse workforce appeals to a wider customer base and in that way contributes to the 
performance of the organisation (Thomas and Ely 1996; Ely and Thomas 2001). In the public 
administration context this (external) effect of diversity can be conceived as closing the gap 
between the organisation and the clients (citizens) it serves. This argument has some 
similarities with the rationale of the theory of representative bureaucracy described in the 
previous section. There it was argued that a bureaucracy will be more responsive to the public 
interest when its personnel reflects the population that is served, in characteristics like race 
and gender. Whereas in this approach to representative bureaucracy the central motivation is 
better serving democratic principles, in the managing diversity approach this is framed as 
better serving the citizen as a client. 
In addition, the argument in the managing diversity approach is based on the integration of 
the contributions of diverse employees and not on differentiation (Milliken and Martins 1996; 
Ely and Thomas 2001). As Coleman Selden & Selden (2001: 324) explain: 
 
“It is about satisfying constituent demands and meeting the needs of all citizens without 
making employees from nondominant cultures or groups feel like their primary role in the 
agency is to serve constituents with apparently similar backgrounds. It is about changing 
work processes to reflect the diversity and creativity of unique perspectives that exist 
within an organization and creating a culture that encourages diverse workers to stay and 
contribute over time.” 
 
Diversity management is concerned with changing the composition of the organisational 
workforce to better reflect trends in the population. In that way it escapes from the 
politicization of public service related to active representation. After all, active representation 
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assumes that minority employees will safeguard or pursue the interests of the minority group 
to which they belong. 
 
Managing a diverse workforce effectively 
Apart from the strategic function of diversity management, a second aspect in the business 
case for diversity is the increased need to effectively manage a diverse workforce. Diversity 
management is helpful in recruitment, selection and retention of the diverse resources 
available in the labour market (Ng and Burke 2005). This argument appeals to the public 
sector as due to the demographic composition of its workforce the decrease of labour supply 
in western countries will affect public sector organisations even more than private sector 
organisations. 
 
Moreover, managing diversity aims at maximizing the human resources within the 
organisation. Following the HRM line of reasoning, diversity management literature 
conceives diversity as a resource to be developed. Diversity is valued, because the integration 
of the different contributions of different employees would improve the internal processes of 
a work group and/or organisation (Ely and Thomas 2001). If managed well, diversity will thus 
contribute to the performance of the individual and the workgroup to which he or she belongs. 
Milliken & Martins (1996) distinguish four consequences of diversity, which in turn affect 
individual, group and organisational outcomes. Their classification is based on a meta-study 
of thirty-four empirical studies on diversity and identifies both positive and negative 
consequences of diversity. Cognitive consequences of diversity refer to the ability of a 
workgroup to process information, perceive and interpret stimuli and make decisions. The 
increase of creativity and innovation often claimed by managing diversity advocates is 
confirmed by Milliken and Martins’ meta-study. However, some cognitive effects may also 
be negative, as the meta-study shows. In addition to the cognitive effects, Milliken & Martins 
(1996) discern affective consequences (the social performance of a workgroup, e.g. in terms 
of satisfaction, commitment, motivation and identification), communication-oriented 
consequences (effects on the processes and patterns of communication within and outside the 
group) and symbolic consequences (the meaning the composition of the workgroup has for 
internal and external stakeholders). 
These four consequences of diversity are omnipresent in diversity management literature, 
albeit they are not systematically examined nor the conditions under which they occur. Note 
again that these effects of diversity are substantially different from the effects of passive and 
active representation that are distinguished in scholarly literature. Whereas in the literature on 
passive and active representation effects are defined in terms of the representation or even 
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pursuing the interests of different groups in society, in the managing diversity literature the 
focus is upon organisational performance in terms of organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
An a-political claim for representativity 
The business case argument for managing diversity has stimulated research into the effects of 
diversity on efficiency and performance, first in private sector organisations by scholars in the 
fields of personnel psychology and Human Resource Management, and later on also by public 
administration scholars (e.g. Kochan, Bezrukova et al. 2003; Pitts 2005; Kalev, Kelly et al. 
2006). However, the evidence is not ample yet, and sometimes even contradictory (Wise and 
Tschirhart 2000; Foster Curtis and Dreachslin 2008). Effects of diversity on performance 
seem to be mixed, and depend on organisational and job characteristics as well as on the type 
of performance that is measured (Wise and Tschirhart 2000; Ely and Thomas 2001; Kochan, 
Bezrukova et al. 2003; Pitts 2006). E.g. when collaboration or coordination is required, 
diversity appears to have a negative effect (Pitts and Jarry 2005). Drawing conclusions about 
the impact of managing diversity is further complicated because programs and instruments are 
varied. In addition, managing diversity in public sector organisations are often a repackage of 
the old EO/AA programs (Kellough and Naff 2004). It can be concluded that effectiveness of 
diversity and diversity policies is seriously under researched, whereas management practices 
are more and more motivated by the business case of managing diversity.  
 
The attractiveness of the business case argument for diversity is a result of the dominance of 
New Public Management thinking with its strong focus on performance and its technocratic 
and a-political approach to the management of public sector organisations (Lynn Jr 1998). 
However, by neglecting the democratic, moral and political arguments for diversity, this 
business case overlooks important motives for diversity that are of special importance in the 
public sector context (compare Wrench 2005). Diversity management presents itself as an a-
moral and a-political approach to representative bureaucracy, and can therefore be seen as 
insufficient to guarantee equity, fairness, and representativity in public sector organisations. 
Despite the use of quite similar concepts and policy instruments, diversity management 
should be seen as fundamentally different from the equal opportunities approach presented in 
the previous section. 
 
Three rival concepts of representative bureaucracy 
The three concepts of representative bureaucracy described above have two common 
characteristics. Making the argument that an administration has to be representative is 
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recognizing that administrators do not just neutrally implement policy. They have 
considerable discretion and therefore it matters who fills a specific position (Coleman Selden, 
Brudney et al. 1998). Academic debates on representative bureaucracy therefore mainly 
emerged after WWII, when beliefs in scientific administration were waning. 
 
Another common characteristic of the three strands of representative bureaucracy is that of 
value congruence, or the realization that public administrators should hold values similar to 
those they represent (Meier and Nigro 1976). Bureaucracies do not just deliver services, but, 
through delivering services, also allocate values (Meier 1993). All three approaches recognise 
that public services have a function beyond just delivering services albeit this argument is 
fading in the third – diversity management – approach. 
 
Together, these two arguments show the distance between theories of representative 
bureaucracy and the Weberian bureaucracy ideal type. A model of neutral bureaucratic 
competence and a strict separation between policy and implementation has no need 
whatsoever for representativity.  
 
Apart from these common grounds, there are substantial differences between the three 
approaches to representative bureaucracy. We distinguish between four dimensions, as also 
shown in table 1. It follows from our analysis that different objectives reflect different visions 
on the role of the state and citizens, call for different representativity criteria and for different 
policy instruments. A mismatch will likely result in failure. At the same time, there are also 
many similarities between the movements and they are therefore not always easy to 
distinguish. Despite the differences in the time period within which these approaches 
emerged, actual policies and acts to make bureaucracies representative have always reflected 
a combination of approaches. A good example is Western governments’ reaction to the social 
contestation in the 1970s which was not only a democratic one, but also a power-political one. 
Active recruitment among disadvantaged groups (such as minorities) not only served a higher 
democratic concern, but it also facilitated the incorporation of rising elites into the 
administration, thereby deflecting criticism and restoring social harmony. 
 
In what follows, we first summarise how the three approaches differ according to the 
motivation they develop to make the bureaucracy representative. In other words, the question 
is answered why bureaucracies should be representative according to the three approaches. 
We then show how representativity is constructed by looking at the scope and focus of 
representativity, and the criteria used to define representativity. In a third section, we show 
what the analysis of these approaches can tell us about the preferred or actual role of the state 
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and of the citizen in this state. In the final section, we show how representativity is created by 
focusing on the policy instruments used. 
  
Why should bureaucracies be representative? 
The first dimension looks at why politicians, governments or citizens want bureaucracies to 
be representative. Behind the three approaches we have discussed in this article there are clear 
objectives and motivations. The representativeness as power approach wants representative 
bureaucracy to control the population and rivals, and to create stability in the political system. 
The equal opportunities approach is a moral approach and sees representative bureaucracy as 
a means to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the state. In contrast to the first approach, 
it uses democratic and moral arguments to argue for equal opportunities for all. The diversity 
management approach sees in representative bureaucracy a means to improve the 
performance, efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Representation is not central to 
this approach, but the diversity within the organisation that emanates from it. 
 
 
Who is representative to whom? 
The second dimension looks at who the bureaucracy should be representative to. The 
spontaneous association with the concept ‘representative bureaucracy’ is that of a bureaucracy 
that mirrors the country’s or area’s population in general. Yet, a representative bureaucracy 
can also mirror the ruling elite, or the specific group of clients that is being served by an 
agency. In most of the representative bureaucracy literature, the focus is on the representation 
of ‘socially and politically meaningful groups’ (Greene, Selden et al. 2001: 379), yet the 
definition of who those groups are is subject to frequent and rapid change. In the equal 
opportunities approach, the bureaucracy is supposed to be representative of the general 
population, while in the diversity management approach, the focus is on being representative 
towards either the specific clients served by a public service, or towards the workforce in a 
specific sector. 
The criteria used to determine whether or not a bureaucracy is representative are also different 
across the three approaches. While the representativeness as power approach still mainly 
focus on territorial or social class criteria to measure representativeness, the equal 
opportunities approach added race and gender as key criteria, and downplayed the role of the 
older criteria. The diversity management approach broadens this set of criteria used to assess 
representativity by adding the importance of looking at factors such as sexuality, disability 
and age. 
The scope of representativeness dimension refers to which parts of the administration are 
subject to representativeness considerations. This can be the bureaucracy in general, policy 
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functions in the administration, or the street level. The diversity conception of representative 
bureaucracy for example narrows the scope of representativity and either focuses on the street 
level bureaucrats and/or on inner workings of public organisations.  
 
What are the roles of citizens and the state? 
The three approaches to representative bureaucracy outlined in this article do not just reflect 
changes in academic debates or in government policies. They each reflect a quite different 
idea of the role of the state in society, and of the role of citizens in these states and societies. 
The representativity as power approach reflects an idea of the state as something that exists to 
create stability and to control a territory. Citizens, in this approach, are seen as subjects with 
few political or democratic rights. The considerations and interests of the state and the ruling 
classes determine the criteria and procedures used for filling public posts. In the equal 
opportunities approach, citizens are seen as political participants who co-create democratic 
society. The state reflects the overall population and society, and is as such, unlike the first 
approach, not different from society. For this reason, the state needs to reflect the values of 
society, and everything the state does needs to contribute to the creation of a harmonious 
society. The diversity management approach is again quite different, because it reduces the 
public sector to a series of service delivery bodies. Concepts such as ‘the state’ have no place 
in this approach, and government and service delivery are reduced to a-political entities and 
processes. Public employment is not at all different from private employment, and 
representativity is only worthwhile for the performance benefits it brings. Citizens, in this 
approach, are clients of public services, and not democratic actors. 
 
How can bureaucracies improve representativeness? 
Each of the three approaches has also used, or is using, specific policy instruments to make 
bureaucracy more (or less) representative. In the power approach, political appointments, 
patronage and spoils systems are typical instruments, but we have also demonstrated that 
meritocratic arrangements were used to shift the power balance in bureaucracies. Policy 
instruments typically associated with equal opportunities approaches include quotas for the 
employment of certain groups, recruitment targets, and the formal announcement of equal 
opportunities policies and equal opportunity pledges. Diversity management approaches are 
more focused on the inner workings of organisations and on behavioural change. Policy 
instruments used are diversity training aimed at countering stereotyping and increasing 
awareness of cultural biases, networking programs and mentoring programs. The policy 
instruments developed within the equal opportunities approach have proved to be very 
popular, and it is not uncommon to see attempts to promote other types of representativity 
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through the use of equal opportunity instruments. Affirmative action for example is often an 
important part of diversity management policies in organisations. 
 
Table 1: Three rival concepts of representative bureaucracy 
 WHY WHO ROLE OF STATE AND CITIZEN HOW 
 Objective & 
motivation 
Focus Criteria Scope Role of the state View of citizens Policy instruments 
Representative 
bureaucracy as 
power 
Control, 
stability, 
penetration, 
accommodation 
Ruling 
elite 
Territory, 
social class 
State 
apparatus or 
workforce in 
general; top 
positions 
Political stability 
and control 
Citizens as subjects Civil service exams, 
meritocracy, Political 
appointments, spoils, 
patronage 
Representative 
bureaucracy as equal 
opportunity 
Morality, 
legitimacy, 
exemplary role 
of the state, 
democracy 
Population Race, gender, 
role of 
upward 
mobility 
Policy 
functions; 
street-level 
bureaucrats 
Authoritative 
distribution of 
values 
Create community 
Citizens as political 
participants 
Quotas, targets, equal 
opportunities policies 
and pledges. targeted 
recruitment 
Representative 
bureaucracy as 
diversity 
management 
 
Performance, 
effectiveness, 
efficiency 
 
Clients 
and 
workforce 
 
 
Gender, 
ethnicity, age, 
sexuality, 
disability 
Street-level 
(strategic 
function) 
Internal 
organisation 
(effective 
management 
of a diverse 
workforce) 
Effective and 
efficient service 
delivery; 
government as a 
business and 
service provider 
Citizens as clients Diversity training, 
networking programs, 
mentoring programs 
Implications for nation-building 
In this paper, we developed a contingency approach to representative bureaucracy. We argued 
that there are three main approaches to representative bureaucracy, and that each of these 
three approaches has its own characteristics. The emergence and successfulness of these 
approaches largely depends on social and political circumstances. This means that certain 
approaches to representative bureaucracy will be much more useful to nation-builders than 
others.  
 
Diversity management is currently en vogue politically and academically. However, as we 
have shown, diversity management is an a-political approach to representative bureaucracy, 
and mainly serves public sector organisations themselves, their employees, and citizens as 
clients. Nation-building on the other hand is a highly political activity. The implication of this 
observation is that a diversity management approach in fragile or emerging states will 
contribute little to nothing to nation building. Diversity management is not concerned with 
political power, democratic equality, equal opportunities, or social justice. Diversity 
management does not build a state and does not create a nation.  
 
Another observation in our contingent approach to representative bureaucracy is that the 
specific view of representative bureaucracy follows political changes and debates. The third 
approach in this paper is therefore unlikely to be the last, and new approaches to 
representative bureaucracy will emerge. One possible such evolution might then originate 
from the growing concerns in Western European countries about the underrepresentation of 
the lower educated in the political arena. Such underrepresentation yields inequality of 
political voice. As a consequence, it is argued, the lower educated feel excluded from the 
established political parties and turn to new populist parties which threatens the political 
stability and unity of the nation (Bovens and Wille 2009). 
The argument can be extended to government bureaucracies, where unskilled jobs have been 
outsourced and where low grades have made way for positions requiring a university 
education. When the lower educated are underrepresented, there is a risk that government 
policies will insufficiently reflect the interests and preferences of this group, which will in 
turn affect the legitimacy of government. A similar argument has already been made by 
Michael Young in 1958, when he coined the term ‘meritocracy’ in his book ‘The rise of the 
meritocracy’ (Young 1958) where he warns against monopolisation by the higher educated. 
Despite the pejorative connotation of the word in Young’s book, meritocracy has nowadays 
become an extremely powerful and positive argument to recruit the best possible (and thus 
higher educated) to public employment. Combined with often exclusive attention for 
efficiency, such meritocracy may lead to a government bureaucracy that is efficient, yet not 
Contingent representativity 
representative towards large parts of the population.  Such an approach would reintroduce 
political arguments into the representative bureaucracy discussion, and would  use stability 
and legitimacy of the state as key motivations for representativity. Citizens, in this approach, 
are not only seen as political participants, but also as stakeholders in government 
bureaucracies. For that reason instruments would have to be developed to enhance the 
participation of the lower educated in bureaucracy and in policy making, which would mean a 
departure from expert-based approaches. In fact, these developments are already observable, 
but have not yet been linked to the concept of representative bureaucracy (e.g. participative 
and interactive policy making).  
 
To conclude, when designing policies to develop representative bureaucracies, it is essential 
to reflect on the objectives of this policy. The instruments used to make the bureaucracy 
representative need to be aligned with dominant conceptions of the state, politics, and 
citizens. A policy or rhetoric that was useful to emancipate Afro-Americans in the US in the 
1960s and 1970s may be quite useless or even counterproductive in other settings. Different 
situations require a different approach to representative bureaucracy. 
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